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The vulnerability of native title :
Fejo v Northern Territory
High Court of Australia, 1998
Most observers expected that the High Court would find that native title
was extinguished by the grant of a freehold estate .Yet, despite the outcome
being as predicted, many Indigenous peoples were disappointed by the
decision in Fejo v Northern Territory (Fejo) .' Arguably, there was scope within
the concept of native title for recognition of the interests of Indigenous
peoples in freehold land in some form, and certainly in land that had been
resumed as vacant Crown land . It was possible that a principle or presumption
of non-extinguishment may have resulted in a more positive outcome in
this case. More than this, there are aspects of the Court's reasoning in Fejo,
and in particular the characterisation of the title, that were troubling for the
doctrine of native title as a vehicle for recognising the rights of Indigenous
peoples over lands .
The Larrakia people, whose country includes areas in and around
Darwin, Palmerston and Litchfield in the Northern Territory, had lodged
an application for a determination of native title . The action in Fejo was
precipitated by the granting of leases, with an option to acquire freehold title,
over lands that had been subdivided by the Northern Territory government
but which were within the area subject to the native title application
. The
Larrakia people took action against the Northern Territory government
and one of the lessees, Oilnet, with respect to the validity and consequences
of the grant of such leases .
The land that was the subject of the Crown leases in dispute was once
part of a tract of land granted as freehold in April 1882 . The land was
later acquired by the Commonwealth in 1927 for public purposes, specific-
ally, as a quarantine station and later a leprosarium
. Both public purpose
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proclamations were revoked in 1980 .The land thus became vacant Crown
land once again .
In the Federal Court, the Larrakia people sought a declaration of native
title in relation to the subject lands .They argued that the Northern Territory
government was required by the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (NTA) to
either negotiate with the Larrakia or to compulsorily acquire their native
title . The Larrakia people also sought injunctions to prevent any further
development on the lands . The High Court was asked to consider a single
ground of appeal : that the trial judge erred in holding that the grant of
freehold was effective to extinguish all native title rights and interests in
the land subject of the grant so that, upon the land being reacquired by the
Crown, no native title rights and interests could then be recognised by the
common law. 2
The facts of the case, specifically the tenure history, raised two important
issues that were yet to be authoritatively determined by the High Court .
The first issue was whether a grant of freehold extinguished native title so
that no form of native title could coexist with freehold title. The second
question was whether extinguishment was permanent and absolute or
whether there was potential for native title under the common law to
`revive' when the land returned to the Crown . The case also dealt with the
issue of injunctive relief available outside the operation of the NTA.These
issues were important for Indigenous peoples in all parts of Australia, but
particularly for those in more settled regions . To this end, the Yorta Yorta,
Nyungar, Wororra and . Miriuwung Gajerrong peoples, amongst others,
intervened to support the action of the Larrakia people .
The freehold question
The grant made in 1882 was for the land, all timber, minerals and
appurtenances to the grantee, `His Heirs, and Assigns for ever' .These terms
were recognised to convey an estate in fee simple, commonly called a grant
of freehold title .The High Court was unanimous in determining that native
title was extinguished by a grant in fee simple, although justice Kirby gave
separate reasons . For Chief Justice Gleeson and Justices Gaudron, McHugh,
Gummow, Hayne and Callinan, native title was extinguished by such a
grant because `The rights that are given by a grant in fee simple are rights
that are inconsistent with the native title holders continuing to hold any
of the rights or interests which together make up native title' . 3
An estate
in fee simple was said to be the closest thing to absolute ownership that
exists in the Australian system of land tenure, by which it allows `every act
of ownership which can enter into the imagination ' . 4
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The conclusion that freehold extinguishes native title was foreshadowed
in Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) (Mabo) where justice Brennan
explained that the relationship between inconsistency and extinguishment
by reference to freehold :
Where the Crown has validly alienated land by granting an interest
that is wholly or partially inconsistent with a continuing right to
enjoy native title, native title is extinguished to the extent of the
inconsistency. The native title has been extinguished by grants of
freehold or of leases but not necessarily by the grant of a lesser
interest (e .g. authorities to prospect for nrinerals) . 5
Similarly, Justices Deane and Gaudron stated that native title was `susceptible
of being extinguished by an unqualified grant by the Crown of an estate
in fee' .'
In a separate judgment in Fejo, Justice Kirby admitted that these state-
ments were not essential to the cases then at hand, indeed the question
had not been fully argued, and as such the Court in this instance was not
strictly bound by previous statements. Moreover, the authorities to date
had given rise to a test that needed to be applied to determine whether,
and to what extent, native title was extinguished by the grant of freehold
title . This test focused on inconsistency as the essence of extinguishment .
In Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) (the Native Title Act case), for
example, the joint judgment of the majority referred to 'extinguishment or
impairment' by `a valid exercise of sovereign power inconsistent with the
continued or unimpaired enjoyment of native title'.' As such, the extent
f extinguishment or impairment would depend on the extent of any
iconsistency. It was open to suggest that, under the test, extinguishment
ould not be construed in a way that takes on an absolute character .
This view was reinforced by the decision of the High Court in Wile
Peoples v Queensland (1996) (Wile) . There, the nature of the pastoral lease
was examined to assess the extent of inconsistency and indeed was found
not to be inconsistent with the continued enjoyment of some elements
of native title, although the rights of the pastoralist, to the extent of any
inconsistency, would prevail.` Therefore, the question of whether freehold
title extinguished native title was open to be tested .
A bundle of rights
In applying the test of inconsistency in Fejo, the High Court gave little or no
consideration to the ways in which native title might coexist with freehold
title . Instead, the way in which the two interests were characterised led the
Court to conclude that there was no possibility for coexistence . There are
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two problems with the way in which native title was characterised .The first
is the adoption of the `bundle of rights' approach and second is the class of
rights attributed to it .
The judgments in Fejo gave judicial credence to the 'bundle of rights'
conception of native title . In seeking to explain native title, the joint
judgment stated that extinguishment does not depend upon the intention
of the party making the grant but on `the effect that later grant has on
the rights which together constitute native title' .° Similarly, Justice Kirby
referred to `the bundle of interests we now call native title' ." The joint
judgment then listed the rights of native title, which related to the use of
land, and `may encompass a right to hunt, to gather or to fish, a right to
conduct ceremonies on the land, a right to maintain the land in a particular
state or other like rights and interests' ." These, it was said, are `rights and
interests that are inconsistent with the rights of a holder off an estate in fee
simple' .' A fee simple estate gives the holder of that estate the right to use
the land as they see fit and to exclude any and every person from access .
This prioritisation of physical access and control did not reflect the unique
nature of the relationship to and interest in the land held by Indigenous
peoples . Moreover, it went against those aspects of the decision in Mabo that
embraced the spiritual and non-physical elements of Indigenous peoples'
traditions, customs and laws relating to lands . Instead, the High Court
superimposed non-Indigenous understandings of relations with land and
the rights and interests that could attach to land over the concept of native
title .
Indigenous peoples in Australia have made little or no claim to displace
the rights of those who hold title under the Australia tenure system yet
they clearly see the potential for recognition of some form of native title
over lands regardless of the tenure. These interests were not explored . The
judgments in . Fejo, in assuming the kind off rights asserted required physical
access to and indeed control over lands, failed to appreciate the potential for
recognition in the concept of native title .
A unique title
The uniqueness, or suigeneris character, of native title was undermined in Fejo .
The importance of understanding native title as a site of mutual recognition
between two peoples and two systems of law found no expression . This is
not merely a reflection on Fejo but on the development of the doctrine
of native title since the decision in Mabo . Drawing on the jurisprudence
of Mabo, Chief Justice Lamer of the Supreme Court of Canada spoke of
aboriginal title (as it is known in Canada) in the context of a reconciliation
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of prior occupation by Indigenous peoples with the assertion of Crown
sovereignty. As such, Chief Justice Lamer suggested that courts need to take
into account both perspectives and to accord due weight to Indigenous
perspectives .
14
It should be noted that the judges in Fejo rebuffed perceived over-reliance
on overseas precedents . All of the judgments argued that decisions in other
conunon law jurisdictions could offer little guidance to the High Court
because the legal, political and historical considerations were markedly
different ." For Justice Kirby, the belated recognition of native title in this
country was seen as a significant factor that negated the value of overseas
authority." Apart from the clear denial of the extent to which native tide
in Australia drew upon and reflected comparative doctrines, this approach is
disappointing in that it suggests that our political and legal history provides
an excuse for a constrained response to the claims of Indigenous peoples .
The High Court in Fejo narrowed rather than enhanced the potential of
native title. More and more, the unique character of native title as a concept
that bridges two legal systems, showing equal respect to the perspective of
both, was replaced with a more restricted. conception, of an. interest that
reflects understandings of land and ownership that are more familiar to the
courts of the coloniser.
A new vulnerability
Despite observations in the judgments to the contrary, it appeared that
native title had become a creature of the common law, as the common law
attached to it characteristics of other tenures in the Australian tenure system .
More devastating was that in doing so, native title entered a hierarchy of
interests and, as Fejo demonstrably made clear, its place was forged at the
lowest point in the scale. The idea of an `inherent vulnerability' in native
title, which was emphasised by justice Kirby, had been an undercurrent of
previous judgments . In Mabo, for example, Justice Brennan observed that,
by the assertion of sovereignty by the Crown, `rights and interests in land
that may have been indefeasible under the old regime become liable to
extinction by exercise of the new sovereign power' ." Similarly, Justices
Deane and Gaudron argued in Mabo that native title could be extinguished
by an exercise of sovereign powers in a manner inconsistent with native title,
and that native title was not protected against impairment by subsequent
grant, unlike the general rules that would apply to an earlier title emerging
from the non-Indigenous tenure system .
18
Rather than explore the principle of inconsistency, justice Kirby, in Fejo,
placed the emphasis on the inherent vulnerability of native title as the basis
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for determining that native title had been extinguished by the grant of
freehold title . Indeed, in rejecting any possibility of coexisting rights, Justice
Kirby stated that :
The inconsistency lies not in the facts or in the way in which the
land is actually used . It lies in a comparison between the inherently
fragile native title right, susceptible to extinguishment or defeasance,
and the legal rights which fee simple confers . 19
Extinguishment occurred because the titles were inconsistent in law, rather
than in fact, according to the characterisation by the Court .
Justice Kirby also advocated judicial restraint in this context arguing, first,
that the Court should not `destroy or contradict' established legal principle,
that is, the skeleton of principle referred to by justice Brennan in
Mabo . 2oA
second reason for restraint was the fundamental importance attached to fee
simple and exclusive possession under the law. Justice Kirby went so far as
to suggest that such tenures were essential to the peace, order and economic
prosperity of every society and, as such, it was not be the role of the courts
to make any change to those tenures, Moreover, Justice Kirby suggested that
the courts should approach any claim that cast doubt on fee simple interests
as a whole with particular caution . The Court in
Fejo unapologetically
privileged non-Indigenous interests, especially freehold interests, reinforcing
the status quo of colonial power relations and undermining the newly
recognised rights of Indigenous peoples in Australia .
The judgments in Fejo rejected the need to examine the Indigenous law to
see whether any native title rights could coexist with freehold title . Instead,
the investigation was carried out wholly within the sphere of the Australian
tenure system. Although the `bundle of rights' attached to common law
native title resembled the character of an Australian tenure, the High Court
rejected any analogies between native title and other interests that have
long been accepted as capable of coexisting with a fee simple interest . In
rejecting such an analogy,Justice Kirby made clear the place of native title in
the non-Indigenous law, taking pains to reiterate the `inherent vulnerability'
of native title and, like the majority, relied on the idea that native title has its
source in, and derives its content from, a body of law outside the common
law as the source of this vulnerability, asserting an inherent superiority in
titles that exist under non-Indigenous law .
This characterisation reflects a `contingent' approach to the rights of
Indigenous peoples, by which the law of the coloniser recognises rights as it
pleases.This goes against the notion that the rights of Indigenous peoples to
their lands are inherent rights or fundamental human rights . The Court in
Fejo adopted a vision of law based on power that comes from the capacity
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to dominate. The selective use of the unique status of native title in this way,
in order to reinforce its susceptibility to extinguishment, is a disappointing
aspect of the development of the doctrine of native title, and for the rights
of Indigenous peoples in general .
Revival and extinguishment
Similar considerations were extended to arguments regarding the revival
of native title
. The Larrakia people argued that, to the extent that any
inconsistency had extinguished native title, that title could be revived if the
land were to return to the Crown and its essential character as unalienated
Crown land was restored. Of course this would depend upon the Indigenous
people showing that native title had continued in fact
. The joint judgment
in Fejo stated that `references to extinguishment rather than suspension of
native title rights are not to be understood as some incautious or inaccurate
use of language' .' The decision in Fejo
determined that extinguishment
was absolute and forever, regardless of the rights and interests that continued
in Indigenous law from which native title derives its source and content .
While recognising that native title has its origins in, and is given its
content by, the laws of Indigenous peoples, the joint judgment further
undermined the status of those laws
. While reaffirming that native title is
neither an institution of the common law nor a form of common law title,
the majority stated, succinctly, that while the existence of Indigenous law is
necessary to establish native title, it is not sufficient
. The existence of rights
over land under Indigenous law will not be enough to receive recognition
under the common law. The High Court dismissed the claim to revival as
seeking `to convert the fact of continued connection with the land into a
right to maintain that connection' . 2 Surely most Indigenous peoples would
argue that this is exactly the basis of their claim .
Justice Kirby took a slightly different view and did not consider that
the ordinary meaning of extinguishment was sufficient basis for rejecting
the appellants' arguments . 23 But Justice Kirby had already foreshadowed
his opinion on this issue
. In deciding that a grant of freehold extinguished
native title, he had stated that :
Doubtless the bundle of interests we now call `native title' would
continue, for a time at least, within the world of Aboriginal custom .
It may still do so . But the conferral of a legal interest in land classified
as fee simple had the effect, in law, of extinguishing the native title
rights .
24
Further, Justice Kirby argued that to recognise a'revival' of native title in
land when. i t
returned to the Crown would be to recognise a'new right' .
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As such,Justice Kirby suggested that this outcome was incompatible with the
notion that native title has its origins in Indigenous law. But this argument
is fraught . To consider a revived native title as a new right, while consistent
with the reasoning of the Court in terms of extinguishment, certainly does
not reflect the continued existence of the laws and customs that underpin
native title in the first instance . Just as the recognition of native title in 1992
did not create a new right but merely acknowledged the failure to recognise
rights, so too the withdrawal of recognition under Australian law should
be capable of re-recognition when the Crown is the beneficial holder of
the estate. In the result, the decision of the Court with regard to revival
combines with the reasoning of the judgments concerning inconsistency to
ensure that, to be enforceable under the common law, native title must fit
within the cracks left by the Australian land tenure system .
The High Court in Fejo makes a distinction between native title that
exists in fact and where it may exist in law. With this reasoning, native title
has truly become a creature of the common law because recognition and
non-recognition occur wholly within that legal system . Once again a legal
fiction, this time called extinguishment, is used to deny the existence of an
alternative legal system that legitimately confers rights and interests, to make
those rights and interests unenforceable under colonial law As the Court
moved to a bundle of rights approach - centred upon physical access - and
asserted that the recognition of native title was dependent upon the common
law, the idea that the source of the right lies in Indigenous law and society
becomes difficult to reconcile with the doctrine of extinguishment .
Conclusion
In Fejo, Justice Kirby justified the High Court's characterisation of
extinguishment by arguing that legal history, legal authority, legal principle
and legal policy had combined to determine that native title was extinguished
absolutely upon a grant of freehold and could never be revived .25 For
Indigenous peoples, the question remains - by whose legal history, and
whose authority are their rights taken away? Considerations of legal policy,
primarily the quest for certainty for non-Indigenous interests,left Indigenous
peoples' rights and interests more uncertain than ever
. As the connection
that Indigenous peoples maintain with their land is transformed, in law, to
a `bundle of rights' centred on physical control and as their rights, in law,
become increasingly more vulnerable to the arbitrary exercise of power,
Indigenous peoples again increasingly find themselves without recourse .
In the Fejo judgments, the doctrine of native title created a hierarchy
of rights and interests which, at every turn, places other interests above
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those of Indigenous peoples . The recognition of rights in Mabo, and the
attempt by the High Court to reconcile the common law with Indigenous
peoples' prior and continuing law and authority in Wik' and Fejo, has been
continually wound back to the notion of native title to accommodate non-
Indigenous interests to the detriment of Indigenous peoples .
Certainty comes from the making ofdecisions .The decision in Fejo could
have created certainty by recognising that Indigenous peoples' connection
to land is an undeniable and essential part of Indigenous identities and
societies . Over freehold land, it may be that the respect that one system
can show to the other is the recognition of traditional custodianship ; that
is, the right to be acknowledged as the first peoples and first owners of that
land.The rights and interests of the fee simple title holder could have been
confirmed, as in Wik. But a relationship that acknowledges and respects
Indigenous peoples as peoples could have been reached by recognising
that Crown land, whatever its tenure history in Australian law, has to be
dealt with in a way that recognises the native title holders . Respect for the
law of Indigenous peoples and their struggle for survival could have been
celebrated by recognising that native title cannot be extinguished absolutely
in the Australian legal system where it continues to exist in Indigenous
law.
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